of its internal weaknesses and contradictionsthough there are a substantial number. To appreciate the full implications of the document, it is essential to consider its general arguments in the context of the current international economic situation. Agreement or disagreement with the Report's general arguments and prescriptions under current circumstances, constitutes the essential backdrop for any sensible discussion of the specifics of the Report. For this reason one may agree with many of the Report's detailed and specific propositions, while nevertheless regarding the document as a whole as fundamentally wrong in its analysis; self-serving in its implicit allocation of responsibility for current problems; misleading in its broad policy prescriptions; and totally unrealistic both with respect to the social and political implications of its 'solutions' and with respect to its assumptions about real aid flws, price and market prospects for African exports and the robustness of Africa's struggling institutional structures.
One central theme of the Report is the now very familiar call for governments to reduce the level of their economic involvement, and to make that which remains more 'technically competent'. This proposition is so central to the Report that in the Executive Summary it is argued: to achieve their growth and equity objective, governments need to select a limited number of activities in which public sector involvement is essential and then undertake them efficiently. Other activities can be managed by apropriate market signals.. . This basic approach to domestic policy is the unifying theme of the study. [World Bank 1981:4] We shall examine ttiis further below, after a brief discussion of the reasons why it is possible to arrive at such a broadly negative view of this particular Report about Africa at this particular time.
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The Report's argument runs broadly as follows: Africa's economic performance over the past two decades has been extremely disappointing, and prospects for the next decade are even more gloomy.
International economic difficulties bear a share of responsibility for the worsening situation, but the relatively poor record of this region, when compared to other areas of the developing world, suggests that Africa has special problems particular to itself. These are attributed largely to African government policies, although, by the same token, the fact that virtually the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has fared relatively badly over the past decade, suggests that whatever it is that is particular to the region is also relatively common within it.
Finally the Report argues that, in any event, whatever may be the degree of blame to be attached to the international economy, the African economies must broadly accept the external environment as given and do the best they can under adverse circumstances. This places the greatest premium on improving the efficiency with which resources are used within the African economies themselves. Africans simply must help themselves, and to this end they must cut out the myriad examples of wasteful and inappropriate resource allocation cited in the Report. The most desirable level and form of government involvement in economic affairs simply cannot be specified without reference to the objectives being pursued by particular governments. These objectives and the political forces which they reflect will play a decisive role in determining whether certain kinds of advice are likely to prove acceptable in practice, and, if accepted, how they would affect social and economic performance as well as political stability.
The Report ignores this question, apart from one passage in which it seeks to suggest that the changes in government involvement are in effect so minor that they do not call into question the political orientation of any particular government. Unfortunately, given the central place accorded to this issue in the argument, this disclaimer appears more than a little disingenuous.
The second issue to be raised concerns the nature of the 'non-state' institutional structures, within which market is supposed to be given much greater scope. This issue is implicitly raised by the Report's rather awkward attempts to deny the logic, or existence, of its own politics. Its hesitation in pushing its 'nightwatchman state' arguments to their logical conclusions, is presumably partially derived from a recognition that alternatives to state services and enterprises are structures which are extremely weak and potentially manipulable and rather different from those posited in a competitive, free market model. This certainly would be one way to reconcile the Unfortunately the Report does not make that argument in any coherent manner.5 Furthermore, it does not deal explicitly with the weakness of current non-state institutional structures, nor with the devastating effect which the current crisis has on them.
It is a sobering thought that even with a strong institutional base markets are known to function very badly under extreme disequilibrium conditions.
If the Report were to develop and reconcile its arguments in some such way it would, however, have to confront the third and fourth issue to be considered, namely the nature of the 'technical expertise' required and the appropriate definition of 'efficiency'. These are not the self-evident and universally applicable concepts which the Report seems to imply.
What 'Technical Expertise'? 'Efficiency' for What?
It is ironic that just when the 'orthodoxies' of technical economic expertise are more and more discredited in the industrial countries, they should be increasingly fervently preached to developing countries on the basis of a highly questionable interpretation of the NIC experience.
It is, furthermore, rather galling to see the World Bank's 'experts' point the finger at the inadequate technical expertise of African governments when in fact these same governments have relied so heavily on the 'expertise' of the Bank, and other external consultants. This is not to argue the ex ante plausibility of much of that advice. Given existing knowledge Some fragments may exist but not necessarily very efficient ones. Increases in relative prices and real purchasing power of export crops are advocated as generally desirable. Since the global price changes for these commodities have been in precisely the opposite direction, at least since 1977 (and, on current Bank projections issued just afterAgenda, will remain so in the 1980s), this is hardly a simple appeal to unimpeded comparative advantage and free play of market forces. Whether it is a desirable form of managed market specialisation is a rather differenz question.
some was good, some questionable and some pretty clearly wrong. In retrospect most now looks much worse. The simple fact is that in the l970s the world's economy changed to such an extent that a vast range of investment decisions made by 'accredited, experts' have simply turned out to be unviable. Major In fact the Report is really nothing more than a relatively crude assertion of that view put forward as a remedy for Africa's present situation. While the Report does little to document or to articulate the claims of that perspective in respect to specific SSA contexts and countries, it will appear convincing to those who already have an over-riding faith in the market and/or in the incompetence of African states.
For others it will appear as an eclectic and ideological argument full of internal contradictions and failing to face its own political implications in any coherent way.
Faulty Solutions and Real Alternatives
The sad fact is that the 'solutions' to Africa's problems proposed by the Report are not essentially different from the advice the Bank has been imposing on Africa all through the period during which the current crisis took shape.6 Their past impact on Africa has been more than a little ambiguous. Its future impact could well be nothing short of disastrous.
The inescapable fact is that the African economies enter the 1980s with structures which are simply not viable in the existing international context. This means that in order to function with any degree of
The two clearest shifts are reduced emphasis on human investment and social service development and the almost total disappearance of absolute poverty elimination and distribution issues from the Agenda. However, the latter arguably never was embodied to a significant extent in actual Bank projects, while the former was either justified in somewhat forced external contribution to growth terms or treated as outside central production oriented economic policy frames.
22 effectiveness, they require a level of imports which simply cannot be paid for. Borrowing to fill the gap represents a 'solution' so long as export markets, net foreign exchange earnings, productivity levels, growth rates, credit availability and real interest rates stand in a certain relationship to each other. Presently these relationships are hopelessly out of line and the result has been to increase dramatically absolute shortages, black markets, corruption, and breakdowns in utilities, transport and other services. It is both arrogant and meaningless for the Bank to assert in that context that, given the other parameters and irrespective of political considerations and problems, the way forward lies through a greater concern with technical expertise and a greater reliance on the market. Such advice cannot be followed for any length of time under current circumstances because the social and political consequences of following it would be so dramatic that the policies would be devastated by the political whirlwinds which would be unleashed. As in the past these domestic political responses could then be blamed for the disasters which follow, rather than being seen as more or less direct consequences of the acceptance of the externally designed policy prescriptions.
Today the international market is in such disequilibrium that to work with equilibrium models is simply absurd. There is not full employment, and without full employment 'international trade' determines not only the pattern of specialisation, but also the relative distribution of unemployment, economic redundancy and starvation. Africa, with its heavy reliance on a limited range of primary exports and its rudimentary manufacturing capabilities, is a prime candidate for more than its share of the latter. These are not clearly defined, mutually exclusive options, but they involve significantly different emphases and their relative merits vary for different times and places. Technically one could distinguish them by the different ways in which each deals with the potential risks involved in a greater and greater reliance on international trade. In practice the second, more cautious option involves short-term sacrifices in periods of boom and expansion which make it very difficult to sustain at such times. If the international situation then deteriorates, the strengths of the more cautious approach may become apparent, but by then that option will usually have been pre-empted by the political consequences of earlier decisions.
For a very few it may be possible to borrow and export their way out of the current situation, but even that must be doubted. For the vast majority there is no such possibility. Meanwhile financial institutions are scouring the world to find borrowers to whom they can lend their plentiful funds with some hope of being repaid. Even Africa would be considered for this role, if those repayments could be exacted irrespective of the social and political consequences. From their perspective this Bank Report theoretically makes very good sense, though the majority of bankers seem to understand that the possibility of such an option being sustained politically for any extended period of time is remote.
It is to be hoped that some international donors can be found to help some African states to pursue a less foolhardy, more sustainable and more equitable strategy for the l980s, presumably on the basis of a radically different agenda. However, in the absence of appropriate political forces within recipient African countries such efforts too will fail.
Unfortunately this Report not only draws unconvincing conclusions, but fails to identify the real choices confronting Africa. In so doing, it has done the search for ameliorative action a substantial disservice.
